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Abstract
This paper investigates the extent to which technology and uncertainty contribute to ￿ uctuations
in real exchange rates. Using a structural VAR and bilateral exchange rates, I ￿nd that neutral tech-
nology shocks are important contributors to the dynamics of real exchange rates. Investment-speci￿c
and uncertainty shocks have a more restricted e⁄ect on international prices. All three disturbances
cause short-run deviations from uncovered interest rate parity.
1 Introduction
A robust ￿nding in international economics is that real exchange rates are substantially more volatile
than other real variables such as output and consumption. Indeed, Rogo⁄ (1996) refers to this excess
variability and the large half-life of real exchange rates as the purchasing power parity (PPP) puzzle.
Understanding the origins and consequences of this puzzle has been a central theme in the literature,
with the recent debate focusing on whether dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models can
capture the deviations from PPP found in the data. Chari et al. (2002), for example, argue that DSGE
models entertaining price stickiness and monetary shocks fail to match the dynamics of real exchange
rates. In contrast, Steinsson (2008) has shown that productivity shocks may be a way to reconcile
sticky price models with the dynamics of exchange rates.1 Hence, understanding the role of technology
in exchange rates is of the uppermost importance because of its clear implications for the PPP puzzle.
At the heart of this controversy lies the issue of what disturbances drive real exchange rates. An
informal introspection points toward the usual suspects: monetary and technology disturbances. The
role of the former type of shocks has been extensively discussed in the literature (see Section 2 for a non-
exhaustive list of related papers). Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), for example, report that monetary
shocks explain between 23% and 43% of the variability of the US dollar against several currencies.2 In
￿I thank George Alessandria forhis helpful comments and Ricardo DiCecio for kindly sharing his price of investment
series. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily re￿ ect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia or of the Federal Reserve System. This paper is available free of charge at www.philadelphiafed.org/research-
and-data/publications/working-papers/.
1A second equally important controversy corresponds to properly measuring the half-life of the PPP deviations (Chen
and Engel, 2004; Imbs et al., 2005).
2In particular, their results correspond to the relative price of the US dollar versus the currencies in Japan, Germany,
Italy, France, and United Kingdom.
1terms of technology shocks, there has been considerably less e⁄ort to study their relation to exchange
rates. An early example of this line of research is Clarida and Gali (1994), who ￿nd that supply
shocks (i.e., disturbances that a⁄ect output in the long run) explain around 10% of the variance of
real exchange rates for several countries. This lack of investigation in the area is surprising given
the signi￿cant attention that technology disturbances have received in the business cycle literature
(Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez, 2007; Justiniano and Primiceri, 2008).
Monetary and technology shocks are hardly the sole contributors to exchange rate variability. For
instance, it seems plausible that exchange rates have reacted to the recent stock market volatility. This
is because highly uncertain periods are typically associated with imprecise forecasts of macroeconomic
variables (Stock and Watson, 2002). To the extent that exchange rates are asset prices, their dynamics
re￿ ect expectations about the future evolution of fundamentals (Engel et al., 2007). Therefore, forecast
revisions arising from uncertainty should contribute to ￿ uctuations in exchange rates. This intuition is
readily con￿rmed in Figure 1, which plots the nominal yen-US dollar exchange rate (left axis) and the
US implied stock market volatility (right axis) for the year 2008. Clearly, the dollar tends to depreciate
as the volatility increases during the last months of the year (the correlation between those two variables
during the last 4 months of 2008 is ￿0:80). Of course, there are plenty of potential explanations for a
dollar depreciation (Engel and West, 2005), but it is still quite suggestive the co-movement of exchange
rates and stock market volatility.
This paper takes on the task of assessing the contribution of uncertainty shocks as well as investment-
speci￿c and neutral technology shocks to the variability of exchange rates. To that end, I extend the
identi￿cation schemes in Gali (1999) and Fisher (2006) for technology shocks, and Bloom (2008) for
uncertainty disturbances, to incorporate the dynamics of international variables. Speci￿cally, structural
VARs and bilateral exchange rates for the US dollar vis-a-vis the Canadian dollar, the yen, and the
British pound serve to understand how real exchange rates react to such shocks. A trade-weighted real
exchange rate is also considered. The main results can be summarized as follows. First, following a
jump in uncertainty in the US, measured as a positive one-standard-deviation shock to stock market
volatility, the dollar depreciates against the other three currencies as well as a trade-weighted currency
index. Furthermore, two years after the disturbance the dollar has lost on average 4% of its pre-
shock value. This depreciation is robust to several VAR speci￿cations. Second, the US dollar tends
to appreciate following investment-speci￿c shocks. Interestingly, the dollar￿ s response is hump shaped,
reaching its highest appreciation (￿ 1:5%) between one and three years after the initial disturbance.
The appreciation, however, is not statistically signi￿cant when measured against the yen.
Third, the US dollar appreciates in the aftermath of positive neutral technology shocks. Yet there
is some heterogeneity regarding the shape of this appreciation. On one hand, the US dollar-Canadian
dollar exchange rate unequivocally displays a hump-shaped response, reaching its peak about a year
after the shock. On the other hand, that disturbance induces a monotonic response in the dollar-pound
rate and a trade-weighted currency index. For the dollar-yen exchange rate, however, the shape of
its impulse response is sensitive to the VAR speci￿cation. Taken at face value, these ￿ndings make it
di¢ cult to attribute the non-monotonic response of exchange rates uncovered from univariate analyses
2(Chueng and Lai, 2000; Steinsson, 2008) to a unique shock. If anything, the data suggest that such a
response most likely results from a convolution of the two types of technology disturbances, in particular,
the investment-speci￿c one.
Fourth, the results from a variance decomposition exercise vary substantially with the exchange
rates and the forecasting horizon. For example, uncertainty and investment-speci￿c disturbances each
contributes to about 30% of the volatility in the real exchange rate between the US and Canada at the
three-year horizon. In contrast, those same shocks have a mild e⁄ect on the volatility of the other two
bilateral exchange rates. The only disturbance that has a similar impact on all bilateral exchange rates
is a neutral technology shock. This shock explains about 16% and 20% of the variability of the US dollar
against the Canadian dollar and the British pound, respectively, at all forecasting horizons. Finally, if
one uses a trade-weighted exchange index, technology shocks in particular, the investment-speci￿c one
explain a larger fraction than the volatility disturbance.
There has been a renewed interest in studying the causes and consequences of the forward premium
anomaly (a non-exhaustive list includes Sarno, 2005; Burnside et al., 2007; Ilut, 2008; Baccheta and van
Wincoop, 2009). An advantage of using bilateral exchange rates is that one can precisely investigate
the e⁄ects of structural shocks on uncovered interest rate parity (UIP). In this regard, the structural
VARs reveal that investment-speci￿c and uncertainty shocks induce signi￿cant deviations from the UIP.
For instance, an excess return of a half percentage point to investing in Canadian dollars arises after
an increase in uncertainty in the US. This premium is statistically signi￿cant and lasts for about eight
months. This ￿nding is quite suggestive given that current explanations of the forward premium puzzle
solely consider nominal disturbances such as monetary shocks (Baccheta and van Wincoop, 2009) or
exchange rate shocks (Burnside et al., 2007). The reason to favor nominal shocks is that the bulk of
the empirical analysis has studied the e⁄ects of such disturbances only on the forward premium puzzle
(Eichenbaum and Evans, 1995; Faust and Rogers, 2003; Scholl and Uhlig, 2008). In contrast, the results
in this paper call for models of the UIP puzzle where uncertainty and technology play a role as important
as that of nominal shocks.
This paper is closely related to the recent contributions of Corsetti et al. (2006, 2008), Bems et
al. (2007), and Enders and Muller (2009). The ￿rst authors identify shocks to the US manufacturing
sector to study the transmission mechanism behind those shocks and macroeconomic interdependence
across countries. In accordance with my results, they ￿nd that a positive productivity disturbance to
the tradable sector causes a real appreciation of the US dollar. The major di⁄erence between our studies
is that I identify economy-wide technology rather than sector-speci￿c shocks. This is because one of the
objectives of this paper is to uncover the contribution of technology in the broad sense to the volatility
of exchange rates. Bems et al. analyze the implications of investment-speci￿c shocks for the current
account in the US. These authors, however, do not explore the consequences of such shocks for the real
exchange rate. Finally, Enders and Muller (2009) recover neutral technology shocks ￿ la Gali (1999)
to show that the terms of trade and the trade balance in the US have an S-shaped cross correlation
function. These authors also report that the real exchange rate in the US appreciates after a positive
technology shock. None of the above papers addresses the issue of the consequences of structural shocks
3on the forward premium.
The asymmetric in￿ uence of structural shocks on exchange rates is not new to this paper. This
feature has been carefully documented in the early work of Clarida and Gali (1994) and Corsetti et al.
(2006). For instance, the ￿rst authors report that while nominal (monetary) shocks explain "more than
one third of the variability of the dollar-yen real exchange rate at a horizon of 4 quarters," these same
shocks explain a mere fraction (less than 1%) of the ￿ uctuations observed in the relative prices between
the US and Canada.
It is widely accepted among market participants that good news is typically associated with a
strengthening of the US dollar, while bad news leads to its depreciation. In fact, one frequently reads
newspaper articles along the lines of dollar depreciates amid increasing uncertainty and dollar declines
due to slowdown in productivity (see the appendix for exact quotes). Taken at face value, this popular
view (Corsetti et al., 2008) suggests that uncertainty and technology indeed a⁄ect exchange rates. As
will become clear, the results in this paper garner some support for the notion that good shocks, say,
advances in productivity, cause dollar appreciations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. A brief summary of the VAR methodologies pursued
in this paper is in Section 2. Section 3 reports impulse response functions to uncover the e⁄ects of
technology and uncertainty on exchange rates. Some sensitivity analysis is provided in Section 4. The
last two sections provide variance decompositions and concluding remarks.
2 Some Reference VARs
This section discusses some methodologies that are relevant for understanding the implications, if any,
of technology and uncertainty shocks on the time series of exchange rates. Speci￿cally, three frameworks
related to monetary, uncertainty, and technology shocks are reviewed.
The e⁄ects of monetary shocks are probably the most studied topic within the VAR literature. It
is now widely agreed that a tightening of monetary policy entails a decline in in￿ ation accompanied by
a sustained contraction in economic activity (for a comprehensive review see, Christiano et al., 1999).
The international dimension of monetary shocks has been studied at least since the contributions of
Clarida and Gali (1994), Cushman and Zha (1997), and Eichenbaum and Evans (1995). In a nutshell,
the last authors conduct their analysis using a parsimonious VAR composed of the following variables:
yt =
￿
log(industrial production);log(CPI);log(NBRX);RUS ￿ RFOR;log(sFOR)
￿
;
where sFOR is the price of the foreign currency in terms of the domestic money; RFOR and RUS are
the foreign and domestic short-term interest rates, respectively; NBRX is the ratio of non-borrowed
to total reserves; and CPI is the consumer price index.3 As argued by Eichenbaum and Evans (1995),
the inclusion of the di⁄erence between domestic and foreign interest rates captures the empirical and
3More recent papers on the international consequences of monetary policy include Faust and Rogers (2003), Kim and
Roubini (2001), Kim (2003), and Scholl and Uhlig (2008). All these papers ￿nd that monetary shocks lead to short-term
￿ uctuations of real exchange rates.
4theoretical results outlined in Messe and Rogo⁄ (1983). In this framework the authors show that a
contractionary monetary shock, as captured by an orthogonalized shock to NBRX , leads to a signif-
icant and persistent, real and nominal, appreciation of the US dollar versus several foreign currencies.
Additionally, the authors report conditional deviations from the uncovered interest rate parity.
2.1 Uncertainty Shocks and VARs
Understanding the consequences of volatility in the economy has been a very active area of research with
important contributions by Cogley and Sargent (2005), Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez (2007),
and Justiniano and Primiceri (2008). Resorting to dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models,
the last two papers ￿nd empirical evidence suggesting that stochastic volatility is a key ingredient in
accounting for the so-called Great Moderation. Furthermore, Bloom (2008) shows that uncertainty
shocks have sizable implications for industrial production and employment in the US, while Fernandez-
Villaverde et al. (2008) show that those shocks have pervasive e⁄ects in emerging economies.
Relying on a VAR formulation and a stock market volatility indicator, Bloom (2008) identi￿es
uncertainty shocks hitting the US. This volatility indicator takes a value of 1 for each of 17 crucial
events that have bu⁄eted the US economy in the past 40 years such as JFK￿ s assassination, the Franklin
National ￿nancial crisis in 1975, the 1987 stock market crash, gulf wars I and II, and the collapse of
WorldCom and Enron (see Figure 1 in his paper). Bloom￿ s reasoning is that uncertainty spikes during
these periods of economic and political turmoil, and this increased uncertainty should induce ￿rms
to scale down production until things calm down. To demonstrate his argument, Bloom essentially
estimates a VAR process for his volatility measure and the log of industrial production in the US. Using
a Cholesky decomposition, he then shows that an orthogonalized shock to the volatility indicator, i.e.,
an increase in uncertainty, produces a marked decline in industrial production. The Wold ordering in
the VAR does not in￿ uence his ￿ndings. His ￿nding is robust to alternative measures of uncertainty
and even after one controls for monetary policy, in￿ ation, employment, and wages, which leads Bloom
to conclude that uncertainty shocks have real contractionary e⁄ects on the economy.
In a theoretical context, uncertainty shocks can potentially a⁄ect international prices. To see this
point, recall that exchange rates are typically viewed as asset prices whose dynamics are determined
by expectations about macroeconomic fundamentals. Engel and West (2005), for example, show that a
large class of open economy models imply that exchange rates obey










where Et is the expectation operator based on information at time t, ￿ 2 (0;1) is the discount factor,
vt is some stochastic process, and ipt and ip￿
t stand for production at home and abroad, respectively.
As suggested in Stock and Watson (2002), forecasting is done frequently and imprecisely during periods
of high uncertainty. To the extent that uncertainty shocks induce households to revise downward their
forecasts of future domestic production relative to foreign production, other things equal, Equation (1)
indicates that a depreciation of the domestic currency should follow the increase in uncertainty. In the
5next sections, I use a modi￿ed version of Bloom￿ s identi￿cation scheme to empirically establish whether
volatility drives exchange rates as suggested by the previous argument.
2.2 Technology Shocks and VARs
Borrowing ideas from Greenwood et al. (1997) and Gali (1999), Fisher (2006) studies the implications of
neutral and investment-speci￿c technological disturbances. Fisher￿ s approach relies on a structural VAR
and the identi￿cation assumption that long-term changes in economy-wide labor productivity results
from both neutral and investment-speci￿c technology shocks, while the price of investment displays
permanent changes only after the later shock. Using such a methodology, he concludes that technology
disturbances can account for up to 38 % of hours￿and 80 % of output￿ s business cycle ￿ uctuations.
Going into the details, Fisher (2006) resorts to a parsimonious VAR consisting of the following
variables yt = [￿pi;t;￿at;log(ht); ￿t;Rt], where pi;t is the relative price of investment, at is labor
productivity, ht is labor, ￿t is in￿ ation and Rt is a measure of the short-term nominal interest rate. To
understand his identi￿cation scheme, consider the following VAR:
yt = A(L)yt￿1 + "t; (2)
where A(L) is a polynomial of lag operators and "t is the one-step-ahead forecast error. If one assumes
that the VAR is invertible, then the corresponding Wold representation is yt = [I ￿ A(L)]
￿1 "t, where
I is the identity matrix.
We are interested in identifying structural shocks, ￿t, the ￿rst of which has permanent e⁄ects on
pi;t and at, while the second one has only long-term implications for labor productivity. If we further
assume that V (￿t) = I and the structural and reduced shocks are related via the equation "t = C￿t,
then identi￿cation requires that the ￿rst two rows of the matrix B ￿ [I ￿ A(1)]
￿1 C have the following
structure "
x 0 0 0 0
x x 0 0 0
#
;
where x is a number di⁄erent from zero. Fisher (2006) identi￿es the ￿rst shock as an investment-speci￿c
shock (IS shock) and the second one as a neutral technology disturbance (NT shock). There are no
additional restrictions on the remaining rows because we are not interested in their associated shocks.
As argued by Fisher, there is a family of matrix rotations satisfying the restriction on the matrix B. A
convenient element of that family is the one corresponding to a Cholesky decomposition, i.e. B = e B e B0
where e B is a lower triangular matrix.
Let b A(L) and b "t be the OLS estimates of the VAR Equation (2) and b ￿ = T￿1 P
tb "tb "0
t be the
associated covariance matrix. Then recovering the matrix e B involves pre-multiplying the Cholesky
factor of [I ￿ A(1)]
￿1 b ￿[I ￿ A0(1)]
￿1 by [I ￿ A(1)], which is precisely the identi￿cation variant proposed
in Christiano et al. (2006) and Bems et al. (2007).
Previous empirical research (among others, Fisher, 2006; Gali, 1999) have established that technol-
ogy does a⁄ect domestic variables. To the extent that technology disturbances drive ￿ uctuations in
6current and future domestic production, as the empirical evidence suggests, models of exchange rate
determination predict that exchange rates should also move after those shocks bu⁄et the economy (see
the discussion above and Equation 1). In other words, the developments in Fisher (2006) and Engel
and West (2005) suggest that technology should in￿ uence the dynamics of exchange rates.
Note, however, that if the arguments above are found to be true in the data, they would establish
only a causal relation between technology shocks and international prices. Furthermore, because Fisher￿ s
identi￿cation rests on overall labor productivity, the relation would be between exchange rates and
economy-wide technology shocks. As argued in Corsetti et al. (2006 and 2008), studying aggregated
shocks complicates learning the transmission mechanism behind movements of exchange rates. To
improve on this dimension, Corsetti et al. (2006) favor the use of labor productivity in the manufacturing
sector, which combined with existing theoretical models facilitates the analysis of the propagation
mechanism.
But then why bother with more aggregated shocks? I choose to concentrate on economy-wide
technology disturbances because by analyzing them one can establish whether technology as traditionally
de￿ned in the business cycle literature (Altig et al., 2005; Gali, 1999) drives real exchange rates. Given
that productivity gains tend to be biased toward the tradable sector (Obstfeld and Rogo⁄, 1996), then
one can use the results from aggregate productivity as a baseline scenario to study more disaggregated
shocks. Finally, identifying aggregate technology shocks allows us to directly apply the theoretical results
from the closed economy literature (Fisher, 2006). Such a direct application is not straightforward if
one were to rely on sector-speci￿c disturbances.
3 Uncertainty, Technology, and Exchange Rates
In this section, I discuss the consequences of uncertainty and technology shocks for exchange rates as
well as the uncovered interest rate parity. The approach consists of blending the ideas in Bloom (2008)
and Fisher (2006) with those in Eichenbaum and Evans (1995). In the discussion that follows, the term
domestic refers to the US economy.
3.1 E⁄ects of Uncertainty Shocks
To understand the implications of uncertainty for exchange rates, I propose to study the properties of
a VAR whose elements are given by
yt =
￿
V olatility;log(industrial production);log(CPI);RUS ￿ RFOR;log(sFOR)
￿
: (VAR #1)
This vector obeys the AR process yt = A(L)yt￿1 + "t, where A(L) is a pth-ordered polynomial in the
lag operator L. Following Bloom￿ s benchmark formulation, the ordering in yt re￿ ects the assumption
that all variables react to a volatility shock (alternative ordering did not change the results). Volatility
corresponds to Bloom￿ s volatility indicator (see Section 2.1). Moreover, the inclusion of the last three
variables follows Eichenbaum and Evans￿(1995) VAR. As previously discussed, using the di⁄erence
7between domestic and foreign nominal interest rates accommodates the theoretical arguments in, among
others, Dornbusch (1976), Messe and Rogo⁄ (1983) and Gali and Monacelli (2005).
Data correspond to monthly observations spanning the period 1982.10 - 2005.12. As will become clear
momentarily, this sample facilitates the discussion and comparison of the consequences of uncertainty
and technology shocks. Details on the data sources are provided in the appendix. As in Bloom (2008),
a value of p equal to 12 is large enough to adequately capture the dynamics of the data.4 Following his
approach, industrial production and the consumer price index are HP-￿ltered prior to the estimation. I
report the properties of the US dollar against the Canadian dollar, the yen, and the British Pound (the
case of the trade-weighted currency index is discussed in Section 4.5). These currencies have received
substantial attention in the empirical literature (Clarida and Gali, 1994; Eichenbaum and Evans,1995)
and they correspond to the historically major trading partners of the US. Except for RFOR, all variables
are for the US. In the rest of the paper, RFor corresponds to the short-term interest rate either in Canada,
Japan, or the United Kingdom. Additionally, sFor is the domestic price of the foreign currency in real
terms. Consequently, an increase in sFor corresponds to a real depreciation of the local currency.
The impulse responses following a one-standard-deviation increase in volatility are reported in Fig-
ure 2. This shock is meant to capture an increase in the level of uncertainty surrounding the economy
(Bloom, 2008). From top to bottom, the rows portray the results when the foreign interest rate and
currency come from Canada, Japan, and the UK, respectively. A solid line corresponds to the point
estimates while dashed lines represent plus- and minus-one-standard-deviation error bands.5 All vari-
ables are expressed as percentage deviations from their pre-shock levels except for interest rates, which
are plotted as basis point deviations from their initial value.
The results from the Canadian case reveal some interesting patterns. To begin with, there is a sharp
decline in US industrial production following the volatility shock, but it quickly bounces back. Indeed,
the economy reaches its lowest production (￿0:75%) about 5 months after the shock, with production
fully recovered after 1 year. Hence, the ￿rst important lesson from this exercise is that Bloom￿ s ￿ndings
are robust to the inclusion of foreign variables.
Upon impact, the interest rate di⁄erential, RUS ￿ RFOR, displays an insigni￿cant decline. This
result, though, teaches us nothing about the individual dynamic responses. In fact, it is consistent with
both rates going up or down simultaneously. Later on, an alternative VAR formulation will help us to
disentangle the dynamic properties of each interest rate. It su¢ ces for now to note that the interest
rate di⁄erential quickly becomes negative and statistically signi￿cant, reaching its lowest level about 15
months after the shock.
One may suspect that following the mute response of the interest rate di⁄erential, investors￿de-
mand for the domestic currency remains unchanged. The nil initial response of the US dollar con￿rm
our suspicion. Note, however, that the Canadian dollar quickly gains ground. Indeed, two years after
4Using a di⁄erent number of lags has no substantial impact on the results. Similarly, using di⁄erences rather than levels
in the exchange rates has minimal impact on the ￿ndings.
5These bands are computed using the Monte Carlo method suggested in Sims and Zha (1999). A total of 500 replications
were used to obtain the error bands for each impulse response.
8the disturbance, the US dollar has depreciated in real terms by roughly 5%.6 Furthermore, the nomi-
nal exchange rate displays qualitatively similar dynamic paths (for space considerations, they are not
reported here but they are available upon request). Abusing Dornbusch￿ s (1976) terminology, we can
argue that the real exchange rate displays an undershooting pro￿le; i.e., the medium term depreciation
results from a smooth sequence of monthly depreciations. More important, the drop in domestic out-
put and the subsequent dollar depreciation is perfectly consistent with the simple exchange rate model
outlined in Section 2.1.
The sharp weakening of the US dollar coupled with the initial mute response of the interest rate
di⁄erential signals potential deviations from the uncovered interest rate parity. To formally assess this
possibility, I follow Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) and Faust and Rogers (2003) in de￿ning ￿t as the ex
post di⁄erence in the return between investing $1 in j-period foreign bonds and investing $1 in j-period









t;j is the return on a j-period bond and sFor
t is the log nominal exchange rate. If the uncovered
parity condition holds, investors expect zero excess returns on average, i.e., Et￿
j
t = 0, where the
expectation operator uses information available up to time t. Since the empirical exercise relies on
short-term interest rates, I consider the case j = 3.
The last column in Figure 1 displays the dynamic response of Et￿
j=3
t expressed in annual terms.
Following the uncertainty shock, there is an excess return of a half percentage point to investments in
foreign currency; i.e., it is better to borrow in US dollars and invest in Canadian dollars. Moreover,
this excess return is above 1% even eight months after the shock but tends to vanish after one year.
This evidence complements the results in Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), Faust and Rogers (2003), and
Scholl and Uhlig (2008), who ￿nd UIP violations following monetary shocks. The results, however,
are inconsistent with theoretical models as in Dornbusch (1976), Gali and Monacelli (2005), Kollmann
(2001) and Monacelli (2004), where UIP holds by assumption.
The Japanese and British cases share some similarities with the Canadian one but there are also some
important di⁄erences. US industrial production contracts after the shock but recovers relatively fast,
which is consistent with the results from the Canadian data. Furthermore, the interest rate di⁄erential
between the US and Japan declines after the shock and remains below its steady state value for about
a year and half. The di⁄erence between interest rates in the US and the UK is slightly positive upon
impact but quickly becomes statistically insigni￿cant. Unlike with the Canadian data, the depreciation
of the US dollar against the yen starts immediately after the shock, which is largely consistent with the
dynamics of this exchange rate portrayed in Figure 1. The depreciation persists in the medium term,
with the dollar losing about 4% of its initial value against either currency. Finally, the deviations from
UIP are substantially di⁄erent from those reported for the Canadian dollar. In particular, note that it
is pro￿table to invest in the US dollar rather than in British pounds or yen. The excess return equals
6Expanding the impulse responses, I ￿nd that the real depreciation of the US dollar remains even after 4 years.
7Lewis (1995) and Sarno and Taylor (2001) provide excellent reviews of the forward premium puzzle.
9almost two percentage points and is statistically signi￿cant 4 months after the shock.
A recurrent ￿nding in this section is that the US dollar depreciates in real terms following an increase
in uncertainty. Interestingly, this association between uncertainty and exchange rates is consistent with
the dynamics of the dollar/yen rate during the last quarter of 2008 (see Figure 1). Section 2 provides
some intuition as to why a depreciation follows an uncertainty shock based on the notion that such a
shock induces downward revisions on industrial production forecasts. An alternative interpretation is
as follows. An increase in the volatility of the domestic stock market induces a sustained recession in
the domestic economy (Bloom, 2008). Fearing that the recession may bring future negative returns,
risk-adverse investors may opt to liquidate their portfolios in the domestic market. Ultimately, this
liquidation reduces the demand for the domestic currency, which leads to its depreciation.
3.2 E⁄ects of Technology Shocks
To understand the implications of technology on exchange rates, let us combine Fisher￿ s (2006) approach









To facilitate the identi￿cation of technology shocks, the VAR speci￿cation preserves the ordering and
variables in Fisher (2006). It also includes the interest rate di⁄erential and the real exchange rate for
the reasons discussed in Sections 1 and 2.8
Data on the price of investment, pi;t, and labor productivity, at, are available only on a quarterly
basis. Additionally, Fisher (2006) ￿nds a statistically signi￿cant break in the price of investment series
in the third quarter of 1982. Hence, the data correspond to quarterly observations spanning the period
1982.3 - 2005.4. Details on the data and sources are discussed in the appendix. Following Fisher, the
number of lags in the VAR is set to 4. As before, I report the dynamics of the US dollar against the
Canadian dollar, the yen, and the British pound.
Figure 3 displays the responses to a positive one-standard-deviation investment-speci￿c technology
shock. The ￿rst row corresponds to the case when Canadian data are used for the foreign variables. As
in Fisher (2006) and Altig et al. (2005), such a disturbance leads to a permanent decline in the relative
price of investment (about 0:6% after 5 years). The shock also permanently raises labor productivity
while producing a non-monotonic increase in hours worked. In addition, the interest rate di⁄erential
rises upon impact by 9 basis points. This result is similar to the initial rise in the feds fund rate reported
in Altig et al. (2005). These authors further report that interest rates in the US display a persistent
response peaking about three quarters after the shock. Unlike with their results, I ￿nd that the interest
rate di⁄erential decays exponentially, which suggests that the foreign interest rate may have a signi￿cant
response interacting with the dynamics of the domestic interest rates. We will con￿rm this observation
resorting to an alternative VAR implementation to be discussed momentarily.
8Bems et al. (2007) rely on a related VAR speci￿cation to analyze US imbalances. Instead of the interest rate di⁄erential
and exchange rates, they use interest rates and the net trade-to-GDP ratio in the US as the last two variables in the VAR.
10In terms of real exchange rates, there is an initial and statistically signi￿cant depreciation of the
US dollar. This depreciation, however, quickly turns into a highly persistent appreciation.9 In fact,
the US dollar exhibits a hump-shaped pro￿le, which reaches its highest value (1:5%) about 3 years
following the shock. Furthermore, it remains appreciated by 1:2% even after ￿ve years. To put these
numbers in context, note that Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) report that the US dollar reaches its
highest appreciation (2%) roughly 3 years after a contractionary monetary shock. Hence, the results
here suggest that investment-speci￿c shocks can possibly explain a fraction of the variability in exchange
rates comparable to that captured by monetary disturbances. This possibility is explored in more detail
in Section 5.
Without a theory of IS shocks and exchange rates, explaining the dynamics of the dollar is akin to
navigating in uncharted waters. Yet if one is willing to speculate a little bit, a plausible interpretation
is as follows. Let us consider the time path of productivity and Equation (1). Following the investment-
speci￿c shock, productivity in the US initially declines, which, other things equal, implies a contraction
in domestic production. According to Equation (1), this decline induces a depreciation of the domestic
currency. Furthermore, as productivity improves, the dollar strengthens.10
Interestingly, the dynamics of the exchange rates are consistent with two widespread views. First,
they con￿rm the observation that favorable disturbances in the US lead to a real appreciation of its
currency (Engel et al., 2007). As noted in the previous paragraph, the real exchange rate appreciates
as productivity rises over time. Second, Bems et al. (2007) report a worsening of the US trade account
following an investment-speci￿c shock. Hence, their ￿ndings and the dollar appreciation in Figure 3
lend support to the textbook view that the strengthening of a country￿ s currency typically leads to a
decline in its trade balance.
The initial spike in the interest rate di⁄erential may result from a compensation due to future dollar
depreciations. In contrast, the empirical evidence shows that the US dollar actually appreciates, thus
signaling potential excess returns from trading bonds denominated in US and Canadian dollars. The
last column in Figure 3 reveals the violation of the uncovered interest parity condition (this ￿gure
plots equation (3) with j = 1, which corresponds to three-month contracts when using quarterly data).
Clearly, borrowing in Canadian dollars and then investing in the US dollars delivers a signi￿cant pro￿t
of 0:5% upon impact. This excess return results from the relatively higher interest rate in US coupled
with the sharp depreciation of the Canadian dollar. Furthermore, the UIP violation persists over the
next two years after the disturbance.
The last two rows in Figure 3 present the IRFs when the foreign variables correspond to Japan
and the UK. The responses with British data are substantially similar to those obtain using Canadian
data. For example, the price of investment displays a permanent contraction following the shock.
Furthermore, the real exchange rate initially depreciates but it tends to improve over time with the
highest appreciation (1:1%) happening two years after the shock. This appreciation, however, is only
statistically signi￿cant in the short run. Indeed, after 5 years we cannot reject the hypothesis that the
9Under incomplete markets and persistent technology improvements, the initial depreciation possibly results from an
initial decline in the terms of trade due to a low trade elasticity (see Corsetti et al., 2006).
10The decline in productivity is so strong that overcomes the expansionary e⁄ect on output due to higher labor supply.
11IS disturbance has no e⁄ect on the dollar-pound rate. There is also evidence of deviations from the UIP
in favor of investing in US dollars, albeit marginally signi￿cant and smaller than that found against
the Canadian dollar. When we turn to the yen, note that this currency immediately depreciates after
the disturbance.11 The maximal depreciation happens about 5 quarters earlier than with the Canadian
dollar and the British pound. In terms of the excess return to investing in dollars or yens, there is
a positive pro￿t from doing it in bonds denominated in the former currency. The return, however, is
signi￿cant only for a couple of quarters after the shock.
The dynamic consequences of a one-standard-deviation neutral technology shock are displayed in
Figure (4). As before, I concentrate on the Canadian case. Extending the number of periods in
the simulations, we would observe that productivity rises permanently by about 0:2%. Hours worked
displays a hump-shaped pro￿le, reaching its highest level four years after the shock. The initial decline
in labor is consistent with the evidence summarized in Gali and Rabanal (2004). The signi￿cant rise
in the interest di⁄erential in favor of the US is consistent with Altig et al.￿ s (2005) ￿nding that interest
rates in the US increase in the aftermath of a neutral technology shock. Here, however, the increase is
also consistent with a scenario in which the domestic interest rate remains unchanged while its foreign
counterpart contracts (more on this in the next section).
More interesting, there is a signi￿cant and hump-shaped real appreciation of the US dollar. At its
peak, the domestic currency has strengthened by 1%, which favorably compares with the values reported
after an IS disturbance (Figure 3). Such a ￿nding highlights the importance of investment-speci￿c as well
as neutral technology shocks in generating high frequency ￿ uctuations in the real exchange rate. The
results reported here are broadly consistent with those presented in Corsetti et al. (2008) and Enders
and Muller (2009). The ￿rst authors, for example, ￿nd that the US dollar appreciates in real terms
following a rise in manufacturing productivity. Indeed, the exchange rate dynamics look remarkably
similar in our studies (see Figures 3 and 4 in their paper). One plausible interpretation of our results is
that an economy-wide productivity disturbance has biased sectoral e⁄ects, with the bulk of the shock
falling on the manufacturing sector. Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (1996) endorse this interpretation by noting
that "the scope for [total] productivity gain is more limited in non-tradables than in tradables." Enders
and Muller report that the real exchange rate of the US dollar against a basket of currencies appreciates
after a positive technology shock identi￿ed ￿ la Gali (1999). The appreciation reaches its highest level
(2%) about 5 quarters after the disturbance.
Figure 4 also shows an excess return to borrowing in Canada and then investing the funds in US
dollars. Upon impact, the pro￿ts from following such a strategy equals 0:2%. Unlike in the case of
investment-speci￿c shocks, the deviations from the uncovered interest parity condition are short-lived
and marginally signi￿cant. Furthermore, the initial excess return is substantially smaller in absolute
value than that found after an uncertainty disturbance.
The last two rows in Figure 4 show the consequences of NT shocks when data from Japan and the
UK are used. Broadly speaking the impulse responses display characteristics resembling those from the
11The immediate appreciation of the US dollar is quite possible if the trade elasticity between Japanese and US goods
is large to begin with (see previous footnote and Corsetti et al., 2006).
12Canadian data, but there are some important di⁄erences as well. As before, productivity in the US rises
between 0:2% and 0:3% ￿ve years after the shock. Furthermore, there is a signi￿cant and persistent
increase in the interest rates in the US relative to those in Japan and the UK. A crucial distinction
relative to the Canadian data is that upon impact the US dollar sharply appreciates against the yen and
pound by 3% and 1:8%, respectively. This initial appreciation tends to vanish in a monotonic fashion
with a brief interruption about a year after the shock. The subsequent weakening of the US dollar is
strong enough to generate a short-lived excess return in favor of investing in either yen or pounds. This
is so even though the interest rate in the US is relatively larger than abroad.
3.3 Summary of Results
To wrap up this section, it is worth emphasizing the e⁄ects of the di⁄erent shocks on real exchange rates.
To begin with, uncertainty, investment-speci￿c, and neutral technology disturbances generate persistent
and signi￿cant deviations away from purchasing power parity. Uncertainty and IS disturbances induce
hump-shaped responses in all three bilateral exchange rates. Except for the US dollar-Canadian dollar
exchange rate, the other two international prices display a monotonic response following a neutral
technology shock. This last ￿nding challenges the theoretical arguments in Steinsson (2008), who
argues that such technology shocks induce a delayed response in real exchange rates.
Investment-speci￿c and uncertainty shocks, and to a lesser degree neutral technology disturbances,
are important contributors to violations of the uncovered interest rate parity. This suggestive evidence
calls for a revision of the current theoretical explanations of the forward premium puzzle. This is because
they have entertained models with nominal shocks as the sole source of ￿ uctuations in the economy.
For instance, the driving force in Baccheta and van Wincoop (2009) is a monetary disturbance, which
combined with infrequent currency portfolio re-balancing gives rise to UIP deviations. Ilut (2008)
explains the forward premium anomaly relying on a model with shocks to the nominal interest rate
di⁄erential between the home and foreign countries and where agents have distorted beliefs. Finally,
Burnside et al. (2007) allow for a richer structure of shocks bu⁄eting nominal exchange rates but none
of these disturbances can be linked to uncertainty or technology.
4 Sensitivity Analysis
The results in the previous section lend support to the view that technology and uncertainty do indeed
contribute to the dynamics of exchange rates. This conclusion, however, is reached based on very par-
simonious VAR representations. In this section, I analyze whether the results are robust to alternative
speci￿cations.
4.1 Uncertainty
Although theoretical arguments (e.g. Dornbusch, 1976; Gali and Monacelli, 2005) point to the use of the
di⁄erence between the foreign and the domestic interest rate, it may well be that such a speci￿cation is
too restrictive from an empirical point of view. Therefore, it seems desirable to assess the implications
13of relaxing that assumption. To this end, the next VAR formulation incorporates each interest rate






The results in Figure 5 indicate that the dynamic paths of production, exchange rates, and the excess
return are una⁄ected by the inclusion of foreign interest rates as a separate element in the VAR. For
example, the US dollar still depreciates in real terms by an amount consistent with that reported in
Figure 2.
A key element in the new results is that we now observe the impulse responses of the interest rates
separately. For the Canadian case (￿rst row), note that interest rates display a U-shaped response,
which mimics that of industrial production. Indeed, interest rates and production reach their lowest
levels around the ￿fth month following the uncertainty shock. Moreover, the initial drop of the interest
rate di⁄erential previously reported (Figure 2) results from a sharp decline in interest rates in the US.
From VAR speci￿cations 1 and 3, we consistently ￿nd a marked and signi￿cant decline in industrial
production following a volatility shock. In a globalized economy, this contraction should be associated
with a drop in domestic imports and hence a slowdown in production abroad. To the extent that the
foreign output decline is expected to last, Equation (1) suggests that omitting foreign production may
be biasing the response of exchange rates. If we want to ameliorate this bias, industrial activity abroad
must be included in the estimation. One way to incorporate such information is to use the di⁄erence
between domestic and foreign production as the relevant variable in the VAR (Clarida and Gali, 1994).
This approach, however, imposes the rather strong assumption of symmetry between the domestic and
foreign economies (Corsetti et al., 2008). While the symmetry premise seems plausible for the US and
Japan, it is di¢ cult to swallow such an assumption when comparing the US with the UK and Canada.
Hence, following Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) and Faust and Rogers (2003), I opt for a more general
formulation, which allows for industrial production at home and abroad to enter separately into the







The new ￿ndings indicate that adding foreign production does not change the results signi￿cantly
(Figure 6). We still observe a real depreciation of the US dollar and deviations from the UIP. In fact,
two years after the shock, the Canadian dollar has appreciated by more than 4%, a value consistent with
our previous ￿ndings. This forward premium for the US-Canada exchange rate is statistically signi￿cant
and short-lived, vanishing one year after the shock. For the other two exchange rates, the excess return
is only statistically signi￿cant for a brief period about 8 months following the initial disturbance.
Foreign industrial production contracts for all countries after the volatility shock, but it is only
statistically signi￿cant in Japan. Furthermore, the temporary appreciation of the US dollar against the
yen is consistent with the relatively strong decline in Japanese production during the ￿rst year. The
14simple exchange rate determination model (Equation 1) suggests a dollar appreciation when production
at home is expected to be stronger than it is abroad.
4.2 Technology
As previously discussed, using the di⁄erence between the foreign and the domestic interest rate may be
too strong from an empirical point of view. The next VAR speci￿cation relaxes such an assumption by








For space considerations, I concentrate on the e⁄ects of technology shocks on the Canadian-based VAR.
The resulting impulse responses in Figure 7 display signi￿cant similarities to those from the benchmark
VAR. For instance, the price of investment declines permanently following the capital embodied shock.
Introducing the interest rates separately into the VAR reveals that the surge in the interest rate dif-
ferential in Figure 3 arises from a combination of an increase in the domestic rate and a contraction
in its foreign counterpart. Note that interest rates in the US display a hump-shaped response. This
last ￿nding corroborates Altig et al.￿ s (2005) results regarding interest rates and IS shocks. More inter-
esting, we still ￿nd an initial depreciation of the US dollar that subsequently switches to a persistent
appreciation. Furthermore, the domestic currency reaches its peak of 2% about 3 years after the initial
disturbance. In fact, even after 5 years the dollar remains appreciated by 1:5%. The main di⁄erence
relative to the baseline VAR #2 is that the response of the dollar/yen exchange rate is not statistically
signi￿cant, albeit hump shaped.
When we turn to the UIP response, note that borrowing in Canadian dollars and investing in US
dollars is pro￿table for two reasons: 1) the lower interest rate abroad and 2) the strong appreciation
of the US dollar. This excess return is statistically signi￿cant and persists even two years after the
investment-speci￿c shock.
The implications of a positive neutral technology shock are reported in Figure 8. Note how introduc-
ing the foreign interest rate as an independent element in the VAR does not alter the previous ￿ndings
for Canada. For example, there is a signi￿cant and persistent real appreciation of the US dollar (a
similar situation arises with the other currencies). The decline in the domestic interest rate is consistent
with the empirical results reported in Altig et al. (2005). There is some evidence of deviations from
UIP, albeit marginally signi￿cant.
A closer look at Figure 8 reveals that the dollar/yen rate now displays a non-monotonic pro￿le,
which di⁄ers from the results under the VAR formulation #2. This ￿nding shows that the response
of exchange rates to neutral technology shocks is very sensitive to the currency of reference as well as
the VAR speci￿cation. Consequently, one cannot unequivocally attribute the hump shaped response
of exchange rates found in univariate regression (Chueng and Lai, 2000) to neutral technology shocks.
The empirical results provide only inconclusive evidence to sustain that connection.
An important drawback with the VAR formulations 2 and 5 is that they ignore potential spillovers
15abroad arising from technology shocks at home. Indeed, Backus et al. (1992) report a correlation of 0:43
between the Solow residuals in the US and Canada. Hence, it seems logical to expect that a positive
technology shock at home also raises productivity abroad. But the increase in foreign productivity, via
a boost to foreign production, is likely to in￿ uence the domestic price of the foreign currency (Equation
(1)). Therefore, the results previously displayed may provide a biased view of the true dynamics of the
US dollar following technology disturbances.
To control for potential international productivity di⁄usion, information about technology progress
abroad, i.e., foreign labor productivity and the price of investment, should be incorporated into the
analysis. Doing so, however, presents some important challenges. To begin with, there are no available
measures of the relative price of investment for any of the foreign countries in this study. Second, even
with foreign labor productivity data in hand, we still need to decide how to introduce that variable
in the VAR. As in Section 4.1, I treat the domestic and foreign countries di⁄erently in an attempt to
avoid the curse of dimensionality. Speci￿cally, domestic and foreign productivity enter separately in
the VAR. As argued in the previous section, such a premise has the additional bene￿t of relaxing the










where ￿a￿ corresponds to foreign labor productivity.12 Figure 9 displays the implications of a positive
investment-speci￿c shock. The second and third columns con￿rm our suspicion that improvements at
home ultimately translate into productivity changes abroad. Broadly speaking, the inclusion of foreign
productivity leaves unchanged the conclusions we drew from the more parsimonious VARs. For instance,
interest rates and labor in US rise in response to a capital-embodied shock. More important, the real
appreciation of the US dollar displays substantial similarities to that reported in Figures 3 and 7. That
is, the dollar reaches its highest appreciation (￿ 2%) around 3 years after the economy is bu⁄eted
by the IS shock. The exception once again is the yen, which appreciates after the investment-speci￿c
disturbance, albeit statistically insigni￿cant.
Figure 10 presents the dynamic responses to a positive neutral technology shock. Note that foreign
labor productivity bene￿ts from the technology disturbance at home, although to a lesser degree than
the initial rise in domestic productivity. This observation, therefore, provides further con￿rmation to
Backus et al.￿ s (1992) ￿ndings of international spillovers. By comparing Figures 4 and 10, we observe that
the US dollar-Canadian dollar exchange rate preserves its hump-shaped response even after controlling
for foreign productivity. Its response, however, is smaller than in the absence of technology spillovers.
The peak of the US dollar appreciation is about 0:85% while it is 1:2% in the baseline scenario. Similar
to the benchmark case, there is an excess return from investing in US dollars.
12One potential interpretation of omitting ￿a
￿
t from the VAR is that the e⁄ects of foreign shocks on domestic variables
are small relative to those from shocks to ￿at and ￿p
I
t. In fact, that is the implicit assumption on the VAR formulations
of Blanchard and Quah (1989) and Fisher (2006). By incorporating ￿a
￿
t we ameliorate the consequences of such an
assumption.
16In sum, the real appreciations in the US dollar following investment-speci￿c and neutral technology
shocks are robust to the inclusion of foreign variables such as interest rates and productivity. The
response of exchange rates after the NT shock are somehow smaller but the appreciation is present and
statistically signi￿cant.
4.3 Alternative Interest Rate
The domestic and foreign interest rates in the previous exercises correspond to the e⁄ective fed funds
rate and the 3-month Treasury bill, respectively. I opt to use the fed funds rate to respect the original
constructs in Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), Fisher (2006), and Bloom (2008). This choice, however,
may create a maturity mismatch between domestic and foreign securities and therefore bias the esti-
mates. Such a bias is potentially worrisome for the uncovered interest rate parity. To explore this
possibility, I repeat the estimation of the VAR speci￿cations 1 and 2 using the US 3-month Treasury
bill rate as a measure for RUS.
The new impulse responses are displayed in Figures 11, 12, and 13 for the uncertainty, investment-
speci￿c, and neutral technology shocks, respectively. A quick look at the new results shows that the
responses look qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those from the benchmark VARs. For exam-
ple, the US dollar still depreciates in real terms relative to the Canadian dollar after an increase in
uncertainty. This depreciation is statistically signi￿cant and present even after 2 years. More interest-
ing, the excess returns following the volatility shock are remarkably similar to those uncovered using
the fed funds rate.
When we turn to the technology shocks, note that the price of investment signi￿cantly declines
following a positive capital-embodied shock. Borrowing in Canadian dollars and then investing in US
dollars delivers a signi￿cant excess return, which is consistent with the results reported in Figure 3.
Finally, a similar picture emerges from the impulse responses following a neutral technology shock.
The US dollar, for instance, depreciates vis-a-vis the other three currencies. Moreover, the shape of the
impulse responses is again similar to those found in Figure 4. As far as the UIP response, they agree
with our previous ￿ndings. In summary, using the US 3-month T-bill rate as an alternate interest rate
measure has no signi￿cant impact on the consequences of uncertainty and technology on exchange rates
and the forward premium puzzle.
4.4 Relative Volatility
Stock markets have become more integrated worldwide thanks to the widespread use of electronic
trading. As a consequence, uncertainty shocks at home quickly a⁄ect ￿nancial markets abroad. But by
the same logic in Section 2, one should expect a contraction in foreign output followed by a depreciation
of the foreign currency, which in turn should restrain the decline in the value of the domestic currency.
Hence, it seems necessary to control for changes in foreign stock market volatility. Figure 14 displays
the impulse responses after a volatility shock at home under two scenarios. The ￿rst row shows the
results when the di⁄erence between the home and foreign volatilities are used in the VAR #1 (see the
17appendix for the data description)
yt =
￿
V olatility ￿ V olatilityFOR;log(industrial production);log(CPI);RUS ￿ RFOR;log(sFOR)
￿
:
The second row in turn presents the impulse responses when the volatility measures at home and abroad
enter separately into the VAR
yt =
￿
V olatility;V olatilityFOR;log(industrial production);log(CPI);RUS ￿ RFOR;log(sFOR)
￿
:
The ordering re￿ ects the assumption that the uncertainty shock originates at home and then spreads
to foreign markets. Due to data availability, the foreign uncertainty measure corresponds to the stock
market volatility in Canada.
The new impulse responses show signi￿cant similarities, both qualitatively and quantitatively, to
those reported in previous sections. The most noticeable e⁄ect is that two years after the volatility
shock the US dollar depreciation is about 1 percentage point smaller than that reported in Figure 2.
More important, the depreciation is statistically signi￿cant and highly persistent. Interestingly, the way
the foreign volatility measure enters into the VAR a⁄ects only the statistical signi￿cance of the initial
UIP deviation.
4.5 Trade-Weighted Exchange Rate
As a ￿nal sensitivity test, this section reports the results when a trade-weighted exchange rate (major
currencies) for the US replaces the bilateral ones. Figure 15 presents the impulse responses when using
the VAR speci￿cations #1 and #2. The foreign interest rate is a weighted average of the countries￿
interest rates in the basket of currencies (see appendix). Broadly speaking, the main qualitative conclu-
sions carry over from the previous sections. For example, the real exchange rate depreciates by about
2% after an uncertainty shock. Similarly, technology shocks induce a real appreciation of the US dollar.
The new impulse responses are similar to those of Canada for investment-speci￿c shocks or those of
Japan for the other two shocks. This ￿nding is not completely unexpected because these countries are
the largest trading partners of the US, which implies that their currencies heavily in￿ uence the dynamics
of the trade-weighted exchange rate.
What is interesting to note is that following a neutral technology disturbance the largest appreciation
happens upon impact (1:2%). More important, the dollar￿ s response is not hump shaped, although it is
highly persistent. This ￿nding and those from the sections above suggest that neutral technology shocks
are not necessarily the source of the non-monotonic response of exchange rates found in univariate
reduced-form studies (Chueng and Lai, 2000; Steinsson, 2008). Moreover, looking at Figure 15 it is
clear that investment-speci￿c shocks generate non-monotonic responses in real exchange rates. But
this ￿nding is troublesome because Martinez-Garcia and Sondergaard (2008) show that DSGE models
entertaining investment-speci￿c disturbances are unable to replicate the persistence and volatility of
exchange rates found in the data.
185 Variance Decomposition
The overall contribution (in percentage points) of each shock to the variability of real exchange rates
is displayed in Table 1. Speci￿cally, it reports the percent of the variance of the k-step forecast error
due to each structural disturbance, for k = 1;2; and 3 years. To facilitate the discussion, let us
concentrate momentarily on the US dollar-Canadian dollar exchange rate. At ￿rst glance, the variance
decomposition exercise reveals that all three shocks are important contributors to the variability of real
exchange rates. Take, for example, uncertainty shocks. Under the baseline scenario (VAR #1), these
shocks explain about 13% of the volatility of the real exchange rate one year following the disturbance.
More important, their contribution tends to grow with the length of the forecasting horizon (the IRFs in
Figure 1 already alerted us to the increasing role of uncertainty in explaining the medium-term dynamics
of exchange rates). Indeed, uncertainty explains roughly 32% of the exchange rate variability three years
after the initial disturbance. Interestingly, adding more variables to the VAR speci￿cation has little
impact on the contribution of uncertainty shocks. Depending on the VAR formulation, uncertainty
roughly captures between 22% and 31% of the variability of exchange rates at the two-year horizon.
When we turn to the link between the US dollar-Canadian dollar exchange rate and technology
shocks, three important features surface. First, the individual contributions of technology disturbances
are generally smaller than those found for the uncertainty shock (except for the one-year-ahead decom-
position under NT shocks). For example, under the formulation VAR #2 investment-speci￿c shocks
explain only half of the variability captured by uncertainty at the one- and two-year horizons (com-
pare 7% with 13% and 15% with 28%). Second, the NT disturbance is relatively more important in
the short run than its IS counterpart. According to the benchmark speci￿cation VAR #2, the former
shock explains 16%, while the later shock captures 7% of the one-year-ahead forecast errors. Finally,
the contribution of the IS shocks rises with the forecasting horizon while that of NT shocks tend to be
stable at about 16%.
The picture looks substantially di⁄erent when we study the yen-dollar relationship. Indeed, the
NT shock explains a signi￿cantly large fraction of the ￿ uctuations of the relative prices between Japan
and the US. Under the benchmark speci￿cations, whereas uncertainty explain only a mere 2% (VAR
#1), neutral technology shocks capture 29% (VAR #2) of the exchange rate variability at the one-year
horizon. Interestingly, the variance decompositions in Table 1 reveal that the importance of technology
shocks is robust to the inclusion of foreign productivity (VAR #6). The results also indicate that
uncertainty and IS disturbances roughly explain the same fraction of the forecast errors in the yen-
dollar exchange rate.
The importance of technology shocks is also apparent for the bilateral exchange rate between the
UK and the US. Among the two technology disturbances, it is the NT shock that contributes more to
the ￿ uctuations of the pound-dollar rate. For the benchmark scenario (VAR #2), such a disturbance
explains around 20% of the exchange rate variability at all horizons. On the other hand, uncertainty
shocks explain only a modest 1% of the short-term ￿ uctuations of the bilateral exchange rate between
the US and the UK. Similar to the case with Japan, the relevance of technology shocks in explaining the
dynamics of the pound-dollar rate is robust to the inclusion of foreign variables. In fact, the contribution
19of NT and IS shocks tend to rise as we introduce interest rates separately (VAR # 5) or include foreign
productivity (VAR #6). For instance, IS disturbances explain an additional 16% at the one-year horizon
when foreign productivity is included relative to the benchmark case.
Roughly speaking, the sum of the individual variance decompositions provides an upper bound to
the combined contribution of the three shocks. This sum is a ceiling because uncertainty and technology
shocks are identi￿ed using separate VARs, which is a consequence of the lack of monthly data for the
price of investment and labor productivity. With this caveat in mind, the most conservative scenario
reveals that the three shocks can potentially explain up to 30%, 52%, and 61% of the Cd-US dollar
exchange rate at one-, two-, and three-year horizons, respectively.13 For the same forecasting horizons,
these shocks account for up to 30%, 41% and 44% for the yen-dollar exchange rate and 18%, 29%, and
31% for the pound-dollar exchange rate.
The variance decomposition results when using the US 3-month T-bill rate rather than the fed funds
rate are reported under the label VAR #7. Overall, the results agree with those from the benchmark
VARs #1 and #2. An exception is that the explanatory power of uncertainty and neutral technology
shocks for the US dollar-Canadian exchange dollar rate tend to be smaller than that reported for the
baseline scenario. However, given the large standard errors, we cannot rule out the hypothesis that the
variance decompositions are the same under the benchmark VARs and the alternative speci￿cation with
the US T-bill rate.
When foreign volatility is introduced into the analysis (Section 4.4), the contribution of the uncer-
tainty shock to the one-, two-, and three-year-ahead forecast errors are f7%;15%;16%g for the VAR
with the di⁄erence in volatilities. These contributions are smaller than those from the baseline case.
However, the gap between the two sets of estimates is not signi￿cant after taking into account sampling
errors. If the volatilities enter separately into the VAR, the contributions are f10%;22%;25%g, which
are close to those obtained from the VAR #1.
For the trade-weighted exchange index, the variance decomposition exercise attributes f2%;6%;8%g
to uncertainty shocks, f5%;20%;28%g to investment-speci￿c shocks, and f11%;8%;7%g to neutral
technology disturbances. Similar to the dollar/pound and dollar/yen cases, technology shocks explain
a larger fraction of the ￿ uctuations in the real exchange rate. Yet the investment-speci￿c disturbance
tends to capture more of the variability at the two- and three-year horizons.
Do technology and uncertainty drive exchange rates? Based on the variance decomposition exercise,
the answer is yes but to a lesser extent than one could have initially guessed from the works of Fisher
(2006) and Bloom (2008). Yet the relatively low explanatory power of those disturbances should not be
that surprising. After all, it is just another manifestation of the celebrated exchange rate disconnect puz-
zle (Obstfeld and Rogo⁄, 2000), i.e., the disconnection between real exchange rates and macoeconomic
fundamentals.
Finally, the empirical evidence suggests that uncertainty shocks have localized e⁄ects, while tech-
13The ￿rst number results from summing up the contribution of the uncertainty shock (13% under VAR #1), the IS
disturbance (6% under VAR #6) and the NT shock (11% under VAR #6). The other numbers are obtained in a similar
fashion. The information from VAR #7 is not considered, since it is an alternative speci￿cation to VAR #1 (see Section
4.3).
20nology disturbances seem to have far-reaching consequences for exchange rates. This conclusion results
from the following observations. To begin with, whereas uncertainty shocks explain a disproportionately
large portion of the variability of the US dollar-Canadian dollar exchange rate, this shock explains only a
modest fraction of the other exchange rates (this point was already apparent from the impulse responses
reported in Figures 1 and 2). Second, NT shocks explain comparable fractions of the variability in the
three bilateral exchange rates (see the last four rows in Table 1). Additionally, IS disturbances capture a
sizable portion of the ￿ uctuations in the US dollar/Canadian dollar and trade-weighted exchange rates.
Interestingly, the last two points lend some empirical support to Steinsson￿ s (2008) view that technology
is an essential ingredient in explaining the dynamics of the real exchange rate.
6 Concluding Remarks
Uncertainty and technology disturbances have received a lot of attention in the recent business cycle
literature. This paper has explored the role of those shocks in accounting for the volatility of real
exchange rates as well as deviations from uncovered interest rate parity. Impulse responses and a
variance decomposition exercise reveal that neutral technology shocks contribute to the volatility of the
three exchange rates under study. In contrast, the empirical analysis shows that investment-speci￿c
are more relevant for the US dollar - Canadian dollar and a trade-weighted exchange index, while
uncertainty shocks are important for the former exchange rate.
A puzzling ￿nding is that uncertainty shocks mostly a⁄ect the US-Canada exchange rate. In prin-
ciple, one would expect that given the relatively large amount of trade between these two countries,
Canadian production should decline due to smaller exports to the US after an increase in volatility. As
a consequence, the Canadian dollar would be less attractive and hence the depreciation of the US dollar
should be small. Yet the variance decomposition as well as the impulse responses indicate exactly the
opposite. Without a sound theory of exchange rates and uncertainty, it is impossible to provide a sound
answer to this intriguing result.
Regarding the forward premium anomaly, the results in this paper make some interesting points.
For example, I show that uncertainty and technology shocks induce UIP violations and the sign of these
deviations is currency speci￿c. From a theoretical point of view, these results call for extensions to
existing models of the forward premium anomaly (Burnside et al., 2007; Baccheta and van Wincoop,
2009). Indeed, future developments should impart an important role to uncertainty and technology
and also allow for asymmetric excess returns. Having this country-speci￿c ￿ avor of the UIP puzzle
is probably the biggest challenge, since one must ￿rst identify the source of the heterogeneity. Is it
geographical factors, di⁄erent ￿nancial markets, or monetary policy?
One of the recent debates on the PPP puzzle centers on whether DSGE models entertaining neutral
technology shocks can account for the volatility and persistence of real exchange rates. A central
argument in this debate is that such shocks induce a delayed response in international prices (Steinsson,
2008). My results contribute to this literature with two insightful ￿ndings. First, it is shown that
neutral technology disturbances indeed contribute to the volatility of exchange rates. More important,
21the results here provide inconclusive evidence as to whether neutral technology disturbances induce
hump-shaped pro￿les in real exchange rates.
Table1: Variance Decomposition
Real Exchange Rates
1 year ahead 2 years ahead 3 years ahead




























































































































































































































Variance decomposition for bilateral real exchange rates of Canada (Cd), Japan (Jp) and United Kingdom (UK)
Numbers in square brackets represent a 68% probability interval based on 500 Monte Carlo replications
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The data were acquired through several sources.
￿ Exchange rates
Exchange rates come from Global Insight. End-of-the period (month or quarter) observations are
constructed using daily spot bid London close quotes. If the end-of-the-period day coincides with a
holiday or a weekend, the quote from the immediately preceding business day is used as the observation.
The trade-weighted exchange rate corresponds to the index constructed by the Board of Governors using
major currencies (TWEXMMTH).
￿ Interest rates
The domestic interest rates correspond to the e⁄ective fed funds rate from the St. Louis Fed￿ s
database. The 3-month Treasury bill comes from the St. Louis Fed￿ s database. For the foreign countries,
the short-term interest rates are 3-month treasury bill rates from Global Insight. The foreign interest
rate in Section 4.4 is a weighted average of several interest rates, where the countries and weights
correspond to those used in the index TWEXMMTH:
￿ VAR with uncertainty shocks
The data for the volatility indicator, industrial production, and consumer price index are taken from
Bloom￿ s (2008) database available at http://www.stanford.edu/~nbloom/index_￿les/Page315.htm. For
the VAR in Section 4.4 the domestic stock market volatility is taken from Bloom (2008). The foreign
measure corresponds to actual monthly return volatilities computed as the monthly standard deviation
of the daily TSX Composite Index. The data are taken from the Haver database and start in 1984. For
the UK and Japan, daily observations are only available starting in the late 1990s.
￿ VAR with technology shocks
The price of investment series was kindly provided by Ricardo DiCecio from the St. Louis Fed. Labor
productivity in the US is constructed as the ratio of output to hours worked, which is the de￿nition
pursued in Fisher (2006). In￿ ation in US is constructed using the consumer price index. The CPI,
output, and hours worked come from Global Insight. Finally, foreign labor productivity corresponds to
labor productivity of the total economy available from the OECD economic indicators database.
267.2 Newspaper Quotes
"The violent currency swings show little sign of disappearing as uncertainty over the
economic outlook remains. The dollar fell 13% against the euro in little more than two
weeks in early December." (Swimming with the Currency, WSJ January 6, 2009)
"The euro reversed its losses from the last two days against the dollar Thursday as
investors took pro￿ts and on indications that healthier euro zone nations might support
those under greater economic stress." (Sentiment Towards Euro Improves, WSJ, February
19, 2009)
"The ￿nancial market turmoil that began in August has put serious pressure on the US
dollar: by end-November the dollar had fallen by some 6% since August against a trade-
weighted currency basket tracked by the US Federal Reserve." (Prospects for the dollar next
year, The Economist, December 19, 2007).
"The dollar is likely to decline by at least another 15-20 per cent on average. Growth
di⁄erentials have now moved against the US, which may experience the slowest expansion of
any G7 country in 2007 ... The sharp pick-up in US productivity growth that underpinned
the strong dollar for a decade has been fading." (Europe must look east to deal with the
strong euro, Financial Times, October 12, 2007).





















110 Figure 1: Exchange Rate - Volatility
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Figure 2: Volatility Shock
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Figure 3: Investment-Specific Shock
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Figure 4: Neutral Technology Shock
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Figure 5: Volatility Shock
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Figure 6: Volatility Shock
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Figure 7: Investment-Specific Shock
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Figure 8: Neutral Technology Shock
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Figure 9: Investment-Specific Shock
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Figure 10: Neutral Technology Shock
5 10 15 20
-0.5
0


















FOR                







Real Exchange Rate: US dollar/FCU               







US +  S
t+3






























































Figure 11: Volatility Shock
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Figure 12: Investment-Specific Shock
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Figure 13: Neutral Technology Shock
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Figure 15: Trade Weighted Exchange Rate Impulse Response